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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The year 2020 proved to be 
one of the most volatile and 
destructive years in history. 
Not since the Spanish flu 
pandemic of 1918–1919 has the 
world seen the level of negative 
health, economic, and financial 
consequences witnessed last 
year. Although only one of 
many important consequences, 
state and local government 
finances suffered heavily under 
the weight of people self-
isolating to avoid becoming ill, 
and from efforts to mitigate the 
spread of the virus imposed by 
state governments. 
Illinois became one of the first 
states to enact a shelter-in-
place order in late March.1 Even 
before that, high-frequency 
economic indicators suggested 
that people were starting to 
restrict activities to only those 
essential for sustaining life. 
Figure 1 shows the year-over-
year changes for in-store credit 
card purchases at grocery 
stores, restaurants, and two 
categories of retail sales during 
the pre-pandemic and early 
pandemic period. A value of 
0% indicates that retail sales in 
that category were the same as 
the year before. Therefore, the 
fall of between 50% and 60% in 
restaurant sales at the peak of 
the shutdown, the week of April 
15, 2020, means that charges 
at restaurants fell to a level of 
2Contact: Robin Fretwell Wilson, Director, IGPA: (217) 244-1227
only half of what they were in the same week in 
2019. For reference, the average share of spending 
by households on food in 2019 was 13% of total 
household spending, with groceries accounting for 
just over half of that amount. Spending on apparel 
and services accounted for 3% of total spending, 
and personal care spending accounted for 1.2%.2
Starting in mid-March, sales at grocery stores 
rose dramatically as people stocked up for an 
extended period at home. Sales at restaurants 
and retail activities started to fall during this time. 
After the stay-at-home order was issued, sales at 
these locations plummeted. In April, as it became 
clear that the state would extend the stay-at-
home order, concerns began to mount that 
the state and its local governments would see 
revenue fall dramatically as spending increased 
for social services and healthcare. 
In early April, a report from the Economic and 
Fiscal Heatlh Impact Group releasing this report 
projected that revenue from the “Big Three” state 
revenue sources—individual and corporate income 
taxes and sales taxes—could fall as much as $4.8 
billion in 2020 and by a similar amount in 2021.3 
Many other sources projected similar revenue 
declines, including the Illinois General Assembly’s 
Commission on Government Forecasting and 
Accountability.4
However, during May and June, an interesting 
thing started to happen. People began to adapt 
their behavior to their changing circumstances. 
Once retail establishments and restaurants began 
curbside pickup services, sales started to rise. 
The federal stimulus program pumped billions of 
dollars into the Illinois economy through stimulus 
checks and Paycheck Protection Program 
loans and credits, and acted as a catalyst for 
increased spending.5 Figure 2 shows the credit 
card spending for the period at the end of the 
first wave of COVID-19 until the fall of 2020. 
The recovery is clear in the spending data. For 
example, by the end of the second quarter, 
spending on apparel and accessories rose from a 
low of a nearly 100% annual fall in expenditures 
to between 25% and 30% below 2019 levels. And 
restaurants bounced back to only 15% to 20% 











































































































































Figure 2: Year-over-year change in credit card 





























































































































Figure 1: Year-over-year change in credit card re-
ceipts, State of Illinois, January 1 - April 29, 2020
Source: Earnest Research.
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Rebounding receipts caused us to wonder 
whether the revenue impacts of COVID-19 were as 
dire as predicted at the start of the pandemic. As 
described below, this report presents a statistical 
analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on state 
revenue sources.
 
We find that Illinois’ net revenue loss is much lower 
than what many projected at the beginning of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The state did lose a sizable 
amount of revenue during the early months, but 
much of that loss was recovered.
DATA AND METHODS 
This analysis uses data from the Office of the 
Illinois Comptroller on tax receipts for all major 
revenue sources with annual receipts greater than 
$100 million. The comptroller compiles receipts 
monthly, and the publicly available data goes 
back to fiscal year 2002. Data from July 2014 
through November 2020 were used to build the 
model. This report limits its analysis to receipts 
into the state’s General Funds.6 The reason for 
this limitation is that the state’s balanced budget 
requirement applies only to those funds, and 
therefore the state will feel any real budgetary 
impact in these funds. For the major revenue 
sources, much of the money goes into the General 
Funds. For example, in 2020 about 85% of 
individual income tax revenue, 49% of corporate 
income tax revenue, and 52% of sales tax revenue 
went into the General Funds, as Table 1 shows. 
The revenue sources analyzed here together 
account for more than 94% of General Funds 
revenue, with the Big Three sources accounting 
for just over 60% of General Funds revenue. The 
tax sources are adjusted for rate changes to 
produce consistent data over time.
This report uses a method called an event study 
to measure the impact of COVID-19. Researchers 
in areas such as business finance and public policy 
have used event studies to measure the impact of 
a time-specific event (for example, the release of 
bad news on corporate earnings or a natural event 
on some policy variable). The method consists 
of creating a “counterfactual” for what would 
have happened if the time-specific event had not 
happened, then comparing the actual outcome 
with the counterfactual prediction to determine 
the amount caused by the event. Figure 3 shows 
the logic of an event study. In this simplified, 
hypothetical example, we track revenue over time 
up to the point when an event happens (April 
2020). As the trend in this example is known with 
certainty, we can project it forward in time to 
produce the counterfactual (the blue line). The 
Table 1: Revenue structure, State of Illinois, FY 2020
Note: * indicates Statutory Transfers are net (Transfers In - Transfers Out). 
Source: Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Revenue Source.
Revenue Type
General Funds Other Funds Percent of 
Revenue in 
General FundsRevenue
Share of Total 
Revenue Revenue
Share of Total 
Revenue
Individual Income 
Taxes $18,471,109,270 46.0% $3,188,216,778 2.2% 85.28%
Sales Taxes $8,255,204,460 20.6% $7,505,571,020 5.3% 52.38%
Corporate Income Taxes $2,080,629,717 5.2% $2,168,923,248 1.5% 48.96%
Federal Sources $3,529,274,498 8.8% $21,893,087,828 15.4% 13.88%
Statutory Transfers* $3,294,000,000 8.2% $324,000,000 0.2% 91.04%
Public Utility Taxes $830,500,891 2.1% $755,705,142 0.5% 52.36%
Insurance Taxes, Fees, 
& Licenses $361,439,505 0.9% $120,796,816 0.1% 74.95%
Inheritance Taxes $283,246,933 0.7% $18,520,351 0.0% 93.86%
Licenses, Fees, & 
Registrations $162,001,548 0.4% $2,495,187,064 1.7% 6.10%
Cigarette Taxes $266,565,210 0.7% $583,998,150 0.4% 31.34%
All Other Sources $2,580,154,905 6.4% $103,547,647,172 72.6% 2.43%
Total Revenue $40,114,126,937 $142,601,653,569
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actual amount (orange line) falls dramatically at the 
time of the event and then continues at the same 
trend. The difference between the counterfactual 
and the actual is the amount of the effect.
RESULTS
An example of the statistical results is provided in 
the Technical Appendix. The illustration in Figure 
4 shows the deviations of the actual amount of 
individual income taxes from the forecast de-
veloped with our time-series model, starting in 
September 2019. To the left of the dashed gray line 
showing the virus outbreak and implementation 
of the mitigation efforts, the model fits the data 
well. Then in April 2020, revenue falls dramatically 
compared to the forecast. This was partially due 
to the direct effects of COVID-19, and partially due 
to the delayed tax-filing deadline put into place as 
one of the federal economic recovery plans. But by 
May, revenue had recovered to its expected level, 
and in June it was above the counterfactual. Once 
the delayed filing date passed in July, revenue was 
significantly above the model’s forecast, returning 
in August to near the forecasted level. By Septem-
ber, revenue was running slightly below the mod-
el’s pre-COVID-19 forecast and has stayed close to 
the forecasted value since then. 
This story is congruent with credit card spending 
data. There was a steep fall in spending in most 
categories in April and May, then a recovery 
toward pre-COVID-19 levels. Spending has not 
recovered completely, but it is near what it likely 
would have been in the absence of COVID-19.
This analysis was repeated for all major revenue 
sources. Table 2 (page 5) shows the results of 
the analysis. During the stay-at-home period, the 
state incurred $1.4 billion in lost individual income 
tax revenue due to COVID-19, with more than 
$600 million in losses from other revenue. During 
the recovery period, the state recovered 90% of 
the individual income tax revenue loss. Therefore, 
the net effect for major revenue sources in the 
General Revenue Fund is a net loss of $868 
million due to COVID-19 up to November 2020. 
Looking at the Big Three revenue sources, the net 
COVID-19-related loss in individual income taxes 
was just less than 1% of the total General Funds 
receipts for that source, much less than forecast. 
Sales tax losses were also less than expected, at 
3.4% of total General Funds sales tax receipts. 
The corporate income tax is one source where 
revenue losses were of a size forecast in early 
2020. The $345 million loss in that revenue source 
is more than 16% of total General Funds corporate 
income tax receipts.
The total loss is far less than what the Economic 
and Fiscal Health Impact Group estimated earlier 
in the year. Some of this is due to using a different 
data source. The data used in the earlier report 
covered the Big Three revenue sources but in all 
funds. The last row of Table 2 shows the estimate 
for COVID-19 related losses in the Big Three 
sources of $800 million. To make this amount 





































































































































































































































Figure 4: Model results, individual income tax 
receipts ($)
Source: Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund, and 
author’s calculations.
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must take the estimated losses for each revenue 
source and apply the percentage of revenue in 
fiscal year 2020 that went to other funds from 
those sources. This is shown in Table 3. Using this 
method, total revenue loss in the Big Three sources 
across all funds totaled $1.44 billion. Though this 
is larger than the loss in General Funds alone, it is 
still below the Economic and Fiscal Health Impact 
Group’s most conservative estimates in the spring. 
This is good news from a budgetary perspective. 
While most forecasters were expecting revenue 
losses of 15-20% from an extended recession, 
Illinoisans can meet the small net loss of revenue 
(accounting for less than 2% of total General Rev-
enue Fund receipts) with relief. In recent weeks, 
both the Commission on Government Forecasting 
and Accountability7 and the Governor’s Office of 
Management and Budget8 have released updated 
forecasts that tacitly acknowledge COVID-19-    
related losses were small, and fiscal year 2021 
revenue has been revised upward.
Table 2: Estimated change in revenue due to COVID-19 in the General Revenue Fund, various periods
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data from Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund.
Revenue Source/Period Lockdown (April - May 2020)
Post-Lockdown 
(June - November 2020) Total Effect
Individual Income Taxes ($1,417,314,000) $1,245,474,000 ($171,840,000)
Sales Taxes (283,736,000) 0 (283,736,000)
Corporate Income Taxes (345,116,000) 0 (345,116,000)
Federal Sources 0 0 0
Statutory Transfers 0 0 0
Public Utility Taxes 0 0 0
Insurance Taxes Fees & Licenses 0 45,794,460 45,794,460
Inheritance Taxes 0 0 0
Licenses Fees & Registrations (17,955,840) (39,609,060) (57,564,900)
Cigarette Taxes (20,346,000) (35,677,620) (56,023,620)
Total ($2,084,467,840) $1,215,981,780 ($868,486,060)
Big Three Sources ($2,046,166,000) $1,245,474,000 ($800,692,000)
Fund Individual Income Taxes Sales Taxes Corporate Income Taxes Total Effect
General Funds ($171,840,000) ($283,736,000) ($345,116,000) ($800,692,000)
Other Funds (29,660,545) (257,970,679) (359,761,331) (647,392,555)
Total COVID-19 Losses ($201,500,545) ($541,706,679) ($704,877,331) ($1,448,084,555)
Table 3: Estimated change in revenue, various revenue sources, all funds
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data from Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund, and Illinois Office of 
Comptroller, Revenue by Revenue Source.
LOOKING AHEAD
Going forward, tremendous uncertainties remain. 
While baseline economic forecasts are optimistic, 
with relatively strong growth in the fourth quarter 
of 2020 and a return to long-term trend growth 
rates (around 2-2.5%) in 2021, most forecasts 
acknowledge more than a fair 
amount of uncertainty due 
to potential COVID-19 spikes, 
vaccine rollout timelines, and 
political risk at the state and, 
more importantly, federal level.9 
Despite the good news on the 
revenue effects of COVID-19, 
the state faces other budget 
challenges. Some of those 
challenges existed prior to 
COVID-19 (a large structural 
deficit and bill backlog) and 
some have happened recently 
but are not directly attributable 
to COVID-19 (voters’ rejection of 
the proposed graduated income 
tax constitutional amendment).
One other benefit of the type 
of analysis conducted here 
is that it supplies a baseline 
for examining risks of COVID-
19-related shutdowns. Had 
shutdowns persisted, this 
model suggests that revenue 
losses could have easily grown 
to a level predicted in the Economic and Fiscal 
Health Impact Group’s earlier report or even 
surpassed them. Little is certain until COVID-19 
is in the rear-view mirror. But Illinois’ response in 
2020 suggests that the economy and our public 
finances are at least somewhat resilient, given 
appropriate countercyclical policy responses.
One factor that likely affected the lower-than-   
expected revenue losses is the unequal distribu-
tion of the effects of the coronavirus. As discussed 
in a recent article in The New York Times,10 the 
labor market effects of the 
virus and mitigation measures 
fell more heavily on low-income   
households. High-income 
households have maintained 
their income levels or even 
seen them rise. And stimulus 
programs have buffered low- 
income household finances. 
Therefore, aggregate incomes 
and consumption have contin-
ued to grow, leading to stable 
or increased state revenue. 
This pattern suggests that 
a key element of resiliency 
is a recognition that our 
revenue systems are based 
on an individual’s income 
and consumption; therefore 
macroeconomic policy 
must support income and 
consumption to ensure a robust 
revenue system. There are 
many ways that this can be 
accomplished, from targeted 
programs such as extended 
unemployment benefits and small business loan 
programs to help businesses withstand the worst 
of virus-related shutdowns, to broader support 
programs such as Economic Impact Relief 
payments (stimulus checks).
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Looking at the Big Three 
revenue sources, the net 
COVID-19-related loss in 
the individual income tax 
was just less than 1% of 
the total General Funds 
receipts for that source, 
much less than forecast. 
Sales tax losses were 
also less than expected, 
at 3.4% of total General 
Funds sales tax receipts. 
The corporate income 
tax is one source where 
revenue losses were of 
a size forecast in early 
2020. The $345 million 
loss in that revenue source 
is more than 16% of total 
General Funds corporate 
income tax receipts. 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
We created the interrupted time-series model by 
first creating an ARIMA time-series model on each 
of the revenue sources indicated in Table 1. 
We followed the Box-Jenkins methodology for 
model building,11 as detailed in Mills.12 The noise 
model follows the form where X is the observed 
variable (individual revenue source), p is the 
autoregressive order (φ’s indicate the autoregres-
sive terms), d is the level of differencing required 
to induce stationarity, q is the moving average or-
der (θ’s being the moving average terms), L is the 
lag operator, and ε is an iid error term. The short-
hand notation for these models is ARIMA(p,d,q). 
For some of the revenue series, there is a seasonal 
component—autoregressive and moving—average 
terms that occur periodically over time. We use 
a multiplicative seasonal model for those series, 
adding L12 and d12 terms to the equation (1). The 
shorthand for this type of model is ARIMA(p,d,q)
(P,D,Q)m where the capitalized terms are the 
seasonal autoregressive, differencing, and moving 
average terms and m is the number of periods in 
each season. Following the Box-Jenkins meth-
odology, models are developed iteratively, with 
residual checking and AIC/MAPE minimization 
evaluation techniques. Table A1 shows the noise 
model structure for each of the revenue sources. 
For all models, we use monthly data, so m=12.
After the noise model was developed, we used a 
set of two pulse variables to model the COVID-19 
event. A pulse variable takes the value of 1 for 
each period that an event occurs and 0 for all 
other periods. For the purposes of this model, 
the term Lockdown is used to indicate limitations 
on the economy. For example, one could effect a 
Lockdown in an economic sense without a stay-
at-home order by simply mandating a closing of 
non-essential businesses. So citizens would be 
free to go out but couldn’t engage in economic 
activities.
The first pulse variable (Lockdown) has a value 
of 1 for the months April and May and 0 for 
other periods. The second pulse variable (post-
Lockdown) has a value of 1 for June through 
November, and 0 for all other periods. We 
then estimated the models using the AS197 
algorithm for maximum likelihood estimation in 
the statistical software gretl.13 We present the 
results below for the Big Three revenue sources. 
Table A2 shows the output from the intervention 
model run on the Individual Income Taxes 
variable, Table A3 for Sales Taxes (page 8), and 
Table A4 for Corporate Income Taxes (page 8).14 
The effects of COVID-19 were calculated by 
multiplying the binary event variables by the 
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Table A1: ARIMA noise models for revenue sources
Notes: Bracketed terms mean that individual lag AR or MA 
terms were included. For example, an AR(3) means three 
AR terms, at lags 1, 2, and 3, were included in the model. An 
AR([3]) indicates only one AR term, at lag 3, was included. 
* - For Federal Sources, an outlier in November 2017 was 
identified and controlled using an indicator variable. 
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data are from 
the Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund.
Revenue Source ARIMA Noise Model
Individual Income Taxes (0,0,0)(1,0,0)
Sales Taxes (1,0,0)(1,0,0)
Corporate Income Taxes (0,0,[3])(1,0,0)
Federal Sources (0,0,0)(1,0,0)*
Statutory Transfers (0,0,0)(1,0,0)
Public Utility Taxes (1,0,0)(2,1,0)
Insurance Taxes Fees & Licenses (1,0,0)(1,0,0)
Inheritance Taxes ([5],0,0)(0,0,0)
Licenses Fees & Registrations ([1,2,10],0,0)(1,0,0)
Cigarette Taxes ([3,8],0,0)(0,0,0)
Table A2: Results of interrupted time-series model, 
dependent variable is Individual Income Tax revenue
Notes:* p <0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data are from 
the Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
z-
statistic
Constant 1,546,190,000 122,644,000 12.61***
Seasonal AR1 0.84 0.05 15.35***
Lockdown -708,657,000 200,979,000 -3.53***
Post-Lockdown 207,579,000 114,266,000 1.82*
Adjusted R2 0.65
(1 – ∑ p' – d φi Li)(1 – L)dXt = (1 + ∑ q   θi Li) εti = 1 i = 1
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coefficients. For example, for Individual Income 
Taxes, there are two 1’s (April and May) for the 
Lockdown variable. Therefore, the effects in the 
Lockdown period are found by multiplying the 
Lockdown coefficient (-$708,657,000) by 2 to 
yield an estimated Lockdown period effect of 
-$1,417,314,000. For the post-Lockdown period, 
there are six 1’s (June through November), and 
the calculation proceeds as above.
The interrupted time-series model is strong 
against most internal validity concerns. One 
valid concern that could be raised about the 
model is that there could have been other things 
happening during the period of the Lockdown 
that may have affected revenue. And that is 
almost certainly true here, many things were 
changing. But many of the most important factors 
that might affect revenue were driven by the virus 
itself, things like increasing unemployment, and 
reduced income and output. We ran a robustness 
check by entering the closing value of the S&P 
500 Total Return Index, a broad measure of 
stock market returns, as a control variable. This 
should capture perceived risks that might not be 
captured by real economic variables. The results 
of the analysis were qualitatively similar to our 
base models.
Table A3: Results of interrupted time-series 
model; dependent variable is Sales Tax revenue
Notes: * p <0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data are from 
the Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic
Constant 681,749,000 19,999,200 38.09***
Seasonal AR1 0.73 0.07 10.01***
AR1 0.29 0.11 2.65***
Lockdown -141,868,000 36,132,800 -3.93***
Post-
Lockdown 6,590,830 24,814,100 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.64
Table A4: Results of interrupted time-series 
model; dependent variable is Corporate Income 
Tax revenue
Notes: * p <0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. Original source data are from 
the Illinois Office of Comptroller, Revenue by Fund.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic
Constant 188,260,000 52,111,500 3.61***
AR3 0.32 0.11 2.97***
Seasonal AR1 0.83 0.06 15.00***
Lockdown -172,558,000 58,273,100 -2.96***
Post-
Lockdown 42,075,100 40,651,800 1.04
Adjusted R2 0.71
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We are honored to have the opportunity to harness our 
collective research and experience to serve our neighbors and 
the residents of Illinois during a time of great need.
Respectfully submitted,
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